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The Political Economy of Hindu Nationalism:  
From V.D. Savarkar to Narendra Modi 
 
Krzysztof Iwanek* 
Abstract 
In May 2014 India’s stock markets climbed to a record high, anticipating the victory of 
the Bharatiya Janata Party and its charismatic leader, Narendra Modi. However, the first 
economic decisions of Modi’s government did not incite a market revolution (though it 
has only been few months since its inception). This, however, is not surprising if one 
traces the Hindu nationalists’ changing views on economy throughout the last decades. 
The main inspirations of BJP’s ideology have been its mother-organization (RSS), and two 
earlier Hindu nationalist parties: Bharatiya Jana Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha (mostly 
through ideas of its leader, V.D. Savarkar). After briefly describing the views of all of 
these bodies, I will map out the main issues in the Hindu nationalist approach towards 
economy. Finally, I will try to show how the present government of Narendra Modi is 
trying to deal with these discrepancies. 
Keywords: political economy in India, Hindu nationalism, Hindutva, swadeshi, Bharatiya 
Janata Party, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh  
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Introduction 
This article seeks to outline the economic views of the Bharatiya Janata Party (‘The 
Indian People Party’, hence BJP) and its ideological predecessors. BJP is currently one of the two 
biggest parties in India, and the ruling one as of December 2014. The ideology and history of 
this party have been often described elsewhere and a longer introduction is hardly necessary 
here (some important monographs include Anderson and Damle, 1987, Basu et al., 1993, 
Graham, 1993, Hansen, 2001, Jaffrelot, 1997, and Kanungo, 1999). In a nutshell, Bharatiya 
Janata Party was formed in 1980 by a Hindu nationalist organization, the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (‘The Union of National Volunteers’, hence RSS) and is still closely linked to 
it. Both the party and the organization follow an ideology called Hindu nationalism or Hindutva 
or ‘Hinduness’, which is more precisely the chief idea of this ideology.  
The ideology of Hindu nationalism always evolved in an opposition to the dominant 
ideology of its main rival, the Indian National Congress (hence Congress). While Congress ruled 
most of the time in independent India, the Hindu nationalists were an important part of of two 
short-lived governments: one in 1977-79 and the other in 1989-1990, and the first long full 
term of their rule, together with allies, came in 1999-2004. In 1990s, while their party was 
growing in strength, it became obvious that the Hindu nationalists are internally divided into at 
least two schools of political economy. When one reads their earlier publications, it will be easy 
to observe that  their actual view of economy was even less coherent. This subject is important 
nowadays, since the Hindu nationalists gained power again in May 2014 and are now facing the 
same ideological discrepancies. 
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 While BJP is 34-years old, at least three sources of its inspiration should be considered. 
One is its mother-organization, the RSS (formed 1925), with which BJP shares in fact not only 
the views, but most of its members as well. BJP was also preceded by two important Hindu 
nationalist parties. These were, Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha (‘The Great All-Indian Council 
of Hindus’, hence Hindu Mahasabha, formed 1914) and Bharatiya Jana Sangh (‘The Union of the 
Indian People’, hence BJS, formed 1951).  
Therefore, this article is divided into 4 parts. The first one briefly discusses some views 
on economy within these main sources of inspiration for the BJP. The second deals with the 
evolving political statements on the economy of the BJP itself. Even these general overviews 
will reveal some above mentioned discrepancies within the Hindu nationalist movement. These 
two sections find their conclusions in the third one, which sums up the main reasons why such 
differences had arisen. The fourth and final section is an exemplification. It shows how the 
present BJP government is dealing with these discrepancies by both words and actions. 
How did the RSS, Hindu Mahasabha and BJS perceive economy – an overview 
Golwalkar’s views on economy 
The first leader of the RSS, K.B. Hedgewar, did not publish much, contrary to the next 
one, M.S. Golwalkar, who inherited the mantle in 1940. Golwalkar was an outspoken critic of 
both communism and capitalism, although in his Bunch of Thoughts he seems to be unable to 
clearly distinguish capitalism and democracy. Both communism and capitalism, Golwalkar 
declares, reduce man’s existence to seeking material gains and both were in practice a means 
to exploit the majority by a clever minority (Golwalkar, n.d.). The Indian state should instead 
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follow the old Indian traditions who recognize the primacy of ethics and culture above purely 
economic needs. This idea will be a recurrent theme in Hindu nationalism, but both in 
Golwalkar’s writings as well as in later sources the concept did not gain any concrete shape. 
Moreover, the above declarations are in contrast to other passages from the same text. The 
RSS leader also claimed that ‘[a]s a matter of fact the success of any government or any 
particular theory of government is to be measured in terms of its capacity to give every citizen 
two square meals, a place to rest in, sufficient clothing, treatment in case of illness, and 
education. That is the acid test’ (Golwalkar, n.d.). While he castigates communism and 
capitalism for focusing on material needs only, he in fact claims that the bottom line of state’s 
existence is fulfilling exactly these needs.  
Although Golwalkar agreed that Mahatma Gandhi’s ideas of trusteeship in productions 
were much more in tune with Indian tradition, he also considered them impractical. ‘The 
labourers lose the incentive for work if they feel that they are not able to get suitable 
recompense.’ – he claims, pointing out to the example of post-War West Germany, where, after 
‘[a]ll  controls were removed’ the state achieved ‘phenomenal economic growth’ (Golwalkar, 
n.d.). In what way, then, did Golwalkar want to recreate Indian traditions in economy? 
Elsewhere he stated that in the old Indian vision of the government ‘The State is not a trader or 
manufacturer but is entitled to regulate all vocations’ (Golwalkar, n.d.). He also criticized 
centralization in contemporary India in the name of ‘Welfare State’ and stood for 
decentralization, which, interestingly, he considered a socialist idea (Golwalkar, n.d.). Despite 
the above mistake, the other passages quoted here would suggest that Golwalkar really favored 
capitalism, but he chose to hide it under the garb of some old Indian tradition of political 
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economy which was somehow more ethical than modern capitalism. Golwalkar’s views are 
more blurred by passages such as this:  ‘There should be some limited right to property 
(coupled with a ceiling on personal income) i.e., scope for fulfilling his [individual’s] desires for 
enjoyment to a limited degree’ (Golwalkar, n.d.). How does such a declaration match his 
appraisal of removing state controls in the Federal Republic of Germany? However, the 
passages such as the above one appear to be in a minority in comparison to Golwalkar’s praises 
of free enterprise. 
Savarkar’s views on economy 
 The first large Hindu nationalist party, the Hindu Mahasabha, never became a governing 
party in India. Its time of greatest strength came in 1930s, a period in which India was still 
under British rule. It seems that its economic program gained a little bit more concrete form 
during the Second World War period. Since 1937 the party had been led by Vinayak Damodar 
Savarkar, the most important ideologue of Hindu nationalism. In his 1939 presidential address, 
Savarkar shared some of his economic views with the public. ‘We shall first of all welcome the 
machine. This is a Machine age’ - he emphasized – ‘The handicrafts will of course have their due 
place and encouragement. But National production will be on the biggest possible machine 
scale’ (Savarkar, n.d.). This declaration was in clear opposition to the ideas of Mahatma Gandhi, 
who was against industrialization and machines as such and favored autonomous villages 
instead of universalizing tendencies of capital. For Savarkar, the charkha (carkhā), the hand-
propelled spinning wheel which Gandhi and his party, the Congress, promoted as an Indian 
response to the British textile industry, was a ‘monomaniac’ solution (Savarkar, n.d.). When in 
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1940 British India had to join London’s war efforts, Savarkar considered it to be a blessing in 
disguise. He observed that the British who so far did not introduce much heavy industry in India, 
were now forced to do so under war conditions. Savarkar called on the Hindus to join the 
factories and gain as much skills as it was possible (Savarkar, n.d.). Hence the industrialization 
of the Hindu nation became one of his chief declared goals. The Hindu Mahasabha leader also 
claimed that should his party rule India, ‘Peasants and labourers must be enabled to have their 
share in the distribution of wealth to such an extent as to enable them not only with a bare 
margin of existence but the average scale of a comfortable life’ but they would not only have to 
share the profits, but also the losses of their companies (Savarkar, n.d.). He did not elaborate, 
however, on how this system or re-distribution of wealth would work in case of peasants.  
Savarkar’s views on private property were not crystal clear as well. In the same 
paragraph of a 1940 speech, he stated both that ‘[p]rivate property must in general be held 
inviolate’ and that some ‘key industries and manufactures […] may be altogether nationalized if 
the National Government can afford to do so and can conduct them more efficiently than 
private enterprise can do’ and ‘[i]n some cases the Government may take over the land and 
introduce State cultivation if it can serve to train up the peasant class as a whole  with the use 
of big machines and agriculture on a large and scientific scale’ (Savarkar, n.d.). In the same 
address he also stressed, in a manner typical to him and other Hindu nationalists, that 
government led by his party would also ‘safeguard the economical interests of the Hindus 
wherever and whenever they may be threatened by the economical aggression of the non-
Hindus’. Finally, Savarkar envisaged a highly protectionist state. In 1940 he called to ‘boycott 
foreign articles’, set up new industries so that India-produced goods would win the competition 
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with the foreign ones and stated that ‘[e]very step must be taken by the State to protect 
National Industries against foreign competition’ (Savarkar, n.d.). In 1945 he reiterated that a 
campaign of boycotting foreign produce and purchasing only Indian articles strengthened the 
country’s economy (Savarkar, 1967). 
The important term used by Savarkar here was swadeshi (svadeśī). The term is an 
adjective that literally means ‘of one’s own country’ and indicates an idea to purchase only 
India-produced goods. Swadeshi became a very important idea of the anti-British movement in 
India decades before independence, though its roots lie in late 19th century. In 1905, in 
response to a controversial partition of the province of Bengal by the colonial government, the 
Congress initiated a swadeshi movement that lasted for few years and remained a very 
important experience for the nascent nationalist movement for the decades to come. For Hindu 
nationalists the swadeshi inspiration probably also goes backs to the 19th century. One of the 
organizations that had wielded a substantial influence on Hindu nationalism was the 1875-
formed Hindu reformist body Arya Samaj. It was one of the organizations and communities that 
held up the idea of swadeshi already in 1880s (Jones, 2006). Right from its birth, swadeshi had 
both a nationalist and economic edge to it. It aroused nationalist pride but was also to the liking 
of Indian industrialists who were endangered by powerful foreign competition (Chibber, 2013).  
Obviously, in conditions of colonial subjugation, swadeshi could only be realized through 
illegitimate movements (e.g. burning of British clothes) and private undertakings (establishing 
new, Indian-run enterprises). However, after India’s independence, swadeshi came to be 
understood as a protectionist approach of the government. It is argued by some that a strict 
government control of the economy introduced in post-independence India was not only a 
8 International Journal of Knowledge and Innovation in Business (IJKIB) 
December 2014, Vol.2, No.1, pp.1-38 
 
result of socialist and communist influences, but also the popularity of the swadeshi idea (Nayar, 
2001). As such, swadeshi is not an invention of the Hindu nationalists. It was and is supported 
by many parties and professional groups in India, and had been most famously used by the 
political rivals of Hindu nationalists. However, as in Savarkar’s case, the Hindu nationalists also 
accepted swadeshi and have been using the term ever since. Contrary to the issue of machines, 
in respect to swadeshi, Gandhi and Savarkar agreed.  
Bharatiya Jana Sangh’s changing views on economy: 1950s to 1960s 
 When it came to industrialization, it was not only Savarkar that opposed Gandhian 
economic ideas. The same was true about some of Gandhi’s influential friends in his own party, 
the Congress. This included Jawaharlal Nehru, who became the first prime minister of 
independent India in 1947 and continued to hold this office until his death in 1964. Nehru was a 
Fabian socialist and when Gandhi and Patel, other leaders of two different ideological trends in 
the Congress, died soon after the independence, Nehru was free to pursue his policies, 
including the economic ones. The turn of the Congress towards socialism was most evident in 
January 1955, when the party publicly promised to strive towards a ‘socialist pattern of society’ 
(Pandey, 1976). Some of the main facets of India’s economy of 1950s and 1960s were (1) 
industrialization, (2) restricting foreign investment, (3) economic planning, (4) strengthening 
state-owned industries, (5) introducing land ceiling acts to curb the dominance of big 
landowners, and (6) distributing the land acquired by land ceiling acts amongst the rural poor. 
Hence Hindu nationalists found themselves in a difficult political position, as they also favored 
most of these solutions, but on the other hand had to somehow depict themselves as differing 
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from the governing party. As we shall see below, in next decades they kept changing some of 
their statements on economy, seemingly looking for a middle way between Gandhian, socialist 
and capitalist visions. 
During the same time, the popularity of the Hindu Mahasabha was on the wane and the 
1951-founded Bharatiya Jana Sangh became the main party of Hindu nationalism. The party’s 
first manifesto, published for the 1951-52 elections, envisaged a strongly protectionist state 
and called to revive ‘the spirit of swadeshi’. It promised to distribute some wealth acquired by 
the industrialists among the laborers (which might have been a continuation of Savarkar’s idea) 
and regulate foreign trade (Mathur and Lal, 2006). When the landlords were dissatisfied with 
the Congress governments because of the land ceiling drive, they offered their support to some 
opposition parties. The BJS, however, still supported the idea of the abolishment of landlordism 
(called zamindari in northern India). In the 1951 manifesto its statements on this subject were 
not as radical as those of the Congress (Mathur and Lal, 2006). In the 1956 manifesto, however, 
BJS showed itself as an outspoken supporter of the abolishment of zamindari, yet in another 
manifesto published next year it added that the landlords would receive some compensation 
(Mathur and Lal, 2006). On the other hand, the above-mentioned second leader of the RSS, M.S. 
Golwalkar, seemingly stood against liquidation of zamindari, just as he criticized government’s 
right to confiscate the land of farmers, ‘operative farming, collective farming, nationalisation of 
banks and industries and such socialistic doctrines’ (Golwalkar, n.d.). Eventually the main party 
that spoke against abolishment and garnered the support of landlords in the years to come in 
many regions of India was Swatantra Party, formed in 1959 (Brass, 2006, Chandra et al., 2002). 
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After two more decades the question of zamindari became a political non-issue, and therefore 
the opinion of Hindu nationalists on this matter was of lesser importance.  
The next, 1956 BJS manifesto’s message was ambiguous. On one hand it wanted to 
protect the village industries (an idea that sounded Gandhian) and again promised to introduce 
profit-sharing for the benefit of the laborers. On the other hand it promised to open the doors 
of India to foreign investment, provided that it would in turn be open to Indian participation 
(Mathur and Lal, 2006). In the 1957 it also called for a reduction a number of taxes and to 
abolish the sales tax (Mathur and Lal, 2006). The government project of joint cooperative 
farming, which eventually proved abortive anyway, was also continuously criticized by Hindu 
nationalists. Their party also demanded decentralization of the federal government’s economic 
power and leaving only the heavy industry under public control, thereby giving more space to 
private companies (Mathur and Lal, 2006, Jaffrelot, 1997). It seems that when the ruling 
Congress moved much closer to socialism in late 1950s, the BJS reacted with talking more about 
free enterprise. With this program, as Ch. Jaffrelot argues, BJS tried to reach out to the middle 
classes electorate, in the sense of middle-income peasants and merchants (Jaffrelot, 1997). The 
1962 manifesto repeated the demands to decentralize the economic system and arrest the 
introduction of joint cooperative farming (Mathur and Lal, 2006). However, it was issues other 
than economy, such as cow protection and defending the country against inner and outer 
threats, that came to the forefront of BJS political strategy in 1960s (Jaffrelot, 1997).  
The undefined idea of Artha. Upadhyaya’s views on economy 
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The same decade witnessed the emergence of what was presented as a new party 
ideology. In a short series of lectures Deendayal Upadhyaya, an important RSS member and BJS 
leader, formulated an idea of ‘Integral Humanism’ that was adopted as the official party 
ideology in 1965 (and is still the official ideology of the BJP). Integral Humanism sought to 
present Hindu nationalism as a liberal and accommodative ideology. Upadhyaya not only 
refrained from uttering the term ‘religion’, and used ‘culture’, Sanskriti and Dharma instead, 
but also called them ‘Indian’ (Bharatiya) rather than ‘Hindu’. He also tried to assimilate 
elements of both Gandhian thought and socialism (Berti, 2007, Zavos, 2000). In terms of 
economy, Upadhyaya stated that India should follow neither capitalism nor communism, and 
should model the economic system on its own traditions. These traditions, he claimed, followed 
both the principles of material gains (Artha) and ethics (Dharma) and the former was always 
limited by the latter (Upadhyaya, 1992). In all of these points Upadhyaya in fact repeated the 
declarations of Golwalkar and other earlier Hindu nationalists. In practice, however, Integral 
Humanism was as vague and innovation-lacking as many other party ideologies. The two more 
concrete concepts Upadhyaya declared by were swadeshi and decentralization (Upadhyaya, 
1992), both of which were used by his party before. He also criticized economic planning. 
However, Upadhyaya does not really inform us how really did he want to revive the traditional 
control of Dharma over Artha. Some of more specific economic proposals in Upadhyaya’s 
Integral Humanism were: guaranteeing employment and a minimum standard of living 
(Upadhyaya, 1992). Contrary to what he would claim, these were much more socialist ideas 
than renascent Indian traditions. In case of some other key issues, the party ideologue refrained 
from taking a definite stand and retained a middle position between socialism, capitalism and 
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Gandhian thought. He suggested creating ‘Bharatiya Technology’, that is machines that would 
fit Indian conditions (Upadhyaya, 1992). This, it seems, was a declaration that sought to find a 
balance between industrialization and traditional Indians means of production, but the Hindu 
nationalists had never put this ambiguous proposal into practice. In the same way, 
maneuvering between socialism and capitalism without suggesting any new solutions, 
Upadhyaya wrote that the issue of both private and public industries should be solved in a 
‘pragmatic and practical’ way (Upadhyaya, 1992). 
The evolution of Bharatiya Janata Party’s view of economy 
The end of BJS and the rise of BJP 
In the late 1960s, Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister, daughter of Nehru and leader of 
the Congress moved closer to the communists. It is still debated whether this decision was 
motivated more by her personal worldview or more by political expediency (as she broke the 
Congress party into two and needed allies). This, however, is irrelevant here. The crux of the 
matter is that the period of 1969-1977 was the period Indian government’s strongest control 
over the economy. The BJS reaction, again, was to move in the opposite direction than the 
ruling Congress. The party’s 1970s public documents criticize nationalization and government 
expenditure, as well as call on to decentralize industrial units and lower the taxes (Mathur and 
Lal, 2006). 
In 1977 BJS became a part of a Janata Party, in which various anti-Congress parties 
merged. After this brisk move, the opposition parties took over central power from the 
Congress for the very first time in India’s independent history and Hindu nationalists found 
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themselves in the ruling establishment. The Janata Party government, however, was a short-
lived one and the Hindu nationalists did not hold economy-linked positions in it, although they 
had the biggest number of Members of Parliament in the Janata Party ranks. Ridden with 
factionalism and facing dire economic problems, the Janata Party government did not manage 
to achieve much. It decreased the land revenue and while that move was consistent with earlier 
Hindu nationalists demands to reduce taxes, probably the real reason for the reform lied 
elsewhere. Janata Party was supported be middle and large peasants and a number of its 
economic undertakings were to the benefit of this class. This included subsidies for the 
agricultural sector, but also the ‘Food for Work’ program for the rural poor (Chandra et al., 
2002). Small industrialists, some of whom are traditional supporters of Hindu nationalism, were 
allowed to expand to new markets (Nayar, 2001). As a symbolical act of swadeshi, IBM and 
Coca Cola were asked to leave India (Nayar, 2001). On the other hand, Janata Party resisted the 
landowners’ plea and endeavor to regain land confiscated by the earlier Congress governments 
(Chandra et al., 2002).  
 Both the Janata Party and its government broke up in 1979. Rather than reinstate 
Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the RSS formed a new political entity, Bharatiya Janata Party, in 1980. 
The new party resolved to strive for ‘Gandhian Socialism’, state intervention and planning 
(Nayar, 2000). That might be surprising at first, given the relation of Hindu nationalists to both 
Gandhi and socialists, but should not surprise if we consider their true attitude to Gandhian 
thought and socialism. It might be remembered that just recently Hindu nationalism had tried 
to adapt parts of both these ideologies in the form of Upadhyaya’s Integral Humanism. As it 
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also turned out, the Hindu nationalists were again moving in the opposite direction than the 
Congress government. 
Towards a ‘more coherent’ program of economic nationalism 
 Pressed by the IMF, the Congress government of 1980s introduced some market 
reforms, bringing down the limits in imports, expanded production and the scope of investment 
of private companies. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi suddenly talked of socialism in a different 
manner than she had in 1970s. While, as usual in her case, it remains uncertain whether this 
was more because of political expediency or more because of  a change of  heart, it is worth 
adding that, beside the IMF pressure, she was facing a growing influence of her sons, first 
Sanjay and then Rajiv, both of whom favored capitalism. After her death, Rajiv Gandhi 
enhanced her ‘small deregulation’ to a ‘middle-range deregulation’ in late 1980s. His reforms 
included a radical customs reduction, allowing monopoly companies to enter certain new 
markets, changing the government definition of a monopoly to a much more liberal one, 
allowing further production enhancement and a small tax reduction (Iwanek and Burakowski, 
2013, Maiorano, 2014). Rajiv Gandhi’s government also borrowed heavily from outside. As 
McCartney observes, ‘Total external debt rose from […] 11.0 per cent to 21.5 per cent of GNP’ 
in the 1980-1989 period (McCartney, 2009).  For this, as well as for letting in some foreign 
companies, he was attacked by the Hindu nationalists (although the need to borrow sprang 
partially from tax reduction, which the Hindu nationalists had also demanded). Nevertheless, 
the support to the idea of market economy was slowly growing among the Indian political class 
and some BJP members were certainly influenced by the same process (Anderson, Damle, 
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1987). 
During the same time, however, the RSS remained closer to the idea of government 
interventionism. M.D. Deoras, who became the leader of the RSS in 1973 and remained in 
power for two decades, was considered to be much more down-to-earth than his seemingly 
spiritually inclined predecessor, Golwalkar. It was Deoras, however, who favored socialism 
while Golwalkar, as we remember, was more favorably inclined towards market economy. 
While Deoras admitted in 1979 that his organization did not have a definite economic policy 
(Rajagopal, 2001), his general views on economy were quite visible. He was a staunch supporter 
of swadeshi and opposed trade liberalization (Kanungo, 2002). Deoras even praised 
communism for inspiring people with ‘strong ideas’ (something which the strongly anti-
communist Golwalkar would never say) and socialism for providing a ‘better deal for weaker 
sections’ (Kelkar, 2011). It was under the leadership of Deoras that the Swadeshi Jagaran 
Manch, the part of RSS to promote swadeshi, was formed in 1991 (see below for more details). 
This means that while BJP moved towards free market ideas until the beginning of the 1990s, 
the RSS leadership went from supporting decentralization during the 1940-1973 period to 
coming closer to socialism in later decades. 
BJP formed a part of a brief, chaotic and internally divided 1989-1990 government. In 
the 1991 campaign the party turned to the idea a much broader economic deregulation (Nayar, 
2000). As it happened, at that time Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress claimed the same goal (Nayar, 
2001). Although BJP won most seats in the 1991 election, nobody wanted to become its 
coalition partner and Congress-led minority government was established. As the country was 
facing a dire economic crisis, Congress opted for a large-scale economic liberalization under the 
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economist-turned-politician minister Manmohan Singh. Rupee was devaluated, government 
licenses in most industries were discontinued, import limitations were mostly done away with, 
foreign direct investment was allowed in many areas, taxes and customs were radically cut, 
government monopolies were substantially reduced (Nayar, 2001, Thirwell, 2004, Frankel, 
2010). In doing all of this, Congress went against the ideas it has been declaring for decades. On 
the other hand, these reforms were in tune with Rajiv Gandhi’s and Manmohan Singh’s 
personal views. Rajiv Gandhi, however, died during the 1991 campaign and therefore did not 
live to see these reforms happen and Manmohan Singh was given a free hand seemingly only 
because the rest of the Cabinet knew no other option, not because it agreed with him. While 
throwing India’s door open to imports and foreign investment was against BJP’s constant idea 
of swadeshi, many other liberalizing reforms of the Congress happened to agree with the Hindu 
nationalist call for deregulation. Once again, the BJP found itself in a situation in which it was 
saying what the Congress was doing. 
 In these circumstances, as K.R. Nayar claims, ‘BJP began to develop a more coherent 
economic program of its own, going beyond mere criticism of the government. The first 
outcome of this effort was an elaborate 54-page Economic Policy Statement in 1992.’ (Nayar, 
2000). While the party repeated its stance on swadeshi, it hinted that this term does not have 
to mean outright protectionism and that foreign direct investment would be allowed, but not in 
the areas where Indian companies functioned well. In the same 1992 document BJP also 
rejected both ‘crony capitalism’ as well economic planning and licensing (Nayar, 2000). The 
attitude towards the latter two was less important in practice, as at that time the Congress 
government was already doing away with both. Ideologically, however, it was important as the 
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BJP was grasping a better defined form of economic nationalism. As it stated in the same 
document, it favored ‘internal liberalization’, not an ‘external’ one, as the latter equaled 
globalization (Nayar, 2000). In another words, the party offered economic liberty to Indian 
companies, but not to foreign ones. However, the expulsion of the American company Enron 
from the state of Maharashtra, in the period when it was ruled by the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance, 
seems to be more of an exceptional case of a BJP’s openly hostile attitude towards a foreign 
firm in 1990s (McGuire and Copland, 2007). Party`s 1998 manifesto claimed that Congress 
government`s recent liberalizing reforms did not go far enough and were introduced in a wrong 
way.    
What the party would not admit at this point was that its new program went against its 
1980-declared goal of ‘Gandhian Socialism’, since large Indian companies would not be limited 
by socialist controls and big industry would grow at the expense of Gandhi-favored small 
traditional industries and villages. However, until today article 4 of the party’s constitution does 
promise to have a ‘Gandhian approach to socio-economic issues leading to the establishment of 
an egalitarian society free from exploitation’ (BJP constitution, 2014). One could also argue that 
the 1992 Economic Policy Statement in fact brought BJP back to Golwalkar’s appraisal of free 
enterprise. In the new circumstances, when socialist ideas where losing ground in India, this 
program made sense. With these declarations in their hands, the BJP could hope to gain 
support of Indian industrialists, whose power grew immensely in wake of the 1991-1993 
reforms. 
The first full tenure of the NDA government and its economic policies 
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 The Hindu nationalists’ time came at the end of the millennium. After a few years of 
shuffles on the Indian political scene, a coalition government with BJP as the lead party was 
formed in 1998. While it did not survive long, soon after the BJP-formed National Democratic 
Alliance (hence NDA) was able to finally rule for a full tenure (1999-2004). The budget of 1998 
was termed a ‘swadeshi budget’ due to its protectionist attitude, but in practise the same year 
BJP started to open the economy to foreign investment (Nayar, 2000). The 1999-2002 were a 
time of broad market reforms under prime minister A.B. Vajpayee. A large scale disinvestment 
was undertaken, though majority stakes were not sold, state monopolies, customs and income 
tax were reduced, and the limits in the number of some imported goods were completely done 
away with. In these circumstances, however, the BJP found an enemy in the RSS, which was 
taken aback by such a betrayal of the idea of swadeshi.  The BJP also revealed itself to be 
internally divided on the question of market reforms. While some Hindu nationalists sat in the 
government, others, belonging to the RSS, protested against some of its measures. Even more 
important was the backdoor influence of the RSS which brought the reforms to a halt in 2002. 
The other events that weakened the position of the government were: a Tehelka website-
inspired corruption scandal of 2001, a few lost state elections of the BJP in 2001-2002 and the 
2003 Supreme Court ruling against disinvestment, all of which weakened the position of 
Vajpayee’s government (Iwanek and Burakowski, 2013). In 2004 the NDA lost power to 
Congress and its new-found allies and regained it only after a decade. 
 These shifts of Hindu nationalists’ declarations regarding economy reveal few colliding 
trends which within the Hindu nationalists movement, trends that its leaders try to 
accommodate. The next section of this article will try to list and explain these discrepancies. 
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The reasons for differing views on economy within the Hindu nationalist 
movement 
The BJP-RSS disagreement 
Firstly, there is a difference in how economy is perceived by the main Hindu nationalist 
party (BJP) and the main organization (RSS). The RSS created BJP and the two seem inseparable 
twins, as most of BJP’s members are also RSS members. However, BJP from time to time acted 
against the will of the mother-organization, especially when in power. Views on economy might 
be the biggest difference between them. RSS is preoccupied more with the Hindu nation than 
the Indian state. Welfare of this nation is not as important as its unity, mental power and 
physical strength. Moreover, since the RSS always puts things Hindu and Indian first, it is a firm 
believer in swadeshi. The RSS-ran schools do not only preach swadeshi in the sense of choosing 
Indian produce but also teach, among others, that one should perform Indian games, which, 
among other advantages, are cheaper (sic!) then Western sports (Tripāthī et al., 2008). In 1991, 
when the communist world was falling apart and India was on the verge of its first broad 
market reforms, RSS created the Swadeshi Jagaran Manch (‘A Forum to Awaken [the Idea of] 
Swadeshi’, hence SJM). It calls for the people to purchase only India-produced goods (Chitkara, 
2004). One of the organization’s opinions is that ‘Liberalisation, globalisation, privatisation 
became attractive instruments for bringing economic slavery.’ (Bajpai, 2008). The organization 
used to come out in protest against companies such as Colgate and Coca Cola. Let us observe 
again that a year after the creation of SJM, the BJP issued an Economic Policy Statement that 
was partially against the ideas of swadeshi (as it allowed a degree of foreign investment). This 
20 International Journal of Knowledge and Innovation in Business (IJKIB) 
December 2014, Vol.2, No.1, pp.1-38 
 
means that the early 1990s were a time when a larger rift between the approach to economy of 
the BJP and that of the RSS was created.  
Differences between the needs of various BJP electorates 
Secondly, the Hindu nationalists are supported mainly by Hindu lower-middle classes 
and small to middle industrialists (Basu et al., 1993, Kanungo, 2002, Graham, 1993). We have 
seen that in the earlier period both Hindu Mahasabha and BJS promised solutions that were 
rather not to the liking of landlords and big businessmen. However, in the last two decades BJP 
became increasingly popular among middle classes and large industrialists. According to 
Hansen, 73% of college graduates and 53% of the business class voted for the party in the 
middle of 1990s (Hansen, 2001). Narendra Modi, has been winning support of large business 
houses in his state of Gujarat, of which he was the Chief Minister for the last 12 years, before 
becoming the prime minister of India this year. In fact already in 1995, before even Modi gained 
the highest position in Gujarat, BJP obtained 70% of middle and upper caste votes in the state, 
according to McCartney (McCartney, 2009).  The fact that some important Indian companies 
such as Reliance have warm feelings for Modi, is well-known.  Now Modi will be striving to 
achieve the same popularity amongst industrialists on the national level. The difficulty will lie in 
the fact that it is easier to compete for Indian investment while ruling one Indian state and one 
of the most developed ones, for that matter (as in the case of Tata Motors factory which, being 
unable to open in West Bengal, was invited by Modi to come to Gujarat). While representing 
the whole of the country, the any prime minister can’t simply strive to bring in all Indian 
investment to one state (unless his government would promote the states ruled by his party 
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above those ruled by opposition parties). However, Hindu nationalists also expand downwards, 
trying to take hold of lower castes and classes, of labor and peasants. The victory of the BJP in 
2014 is partially attributed to its growing leverage with these classes (Chibber and Verma, 2014). 
It is obviously hard to fulfill the expectations of all these communities and classes at the 
same time. The industrialists and middle class expect the BJP to, among others, lower the taxes. 
Some of the lower groups often depend on the state in terms of subsidies and various other 
perks which means it becomes difficult to fulfill their needs after reducing the level of taxation. 
The middle classes and large industrialists are also seemingly not as adverse to foreign direct 
investment as other classes (for the point that not all industrialists support the idea of FDI, see 
McCartney, 2009). However, the small shopkeepers, BJP’s traditional electorate, perceive 
foreign direct investment in the retail sector as a main threat to their existence. The 
discrepancy was best visible when India’s stock markets climbed to a record high in May 2014, 
in anticipation of BJP’s biggest political victory till this date, but while the big firms were 
awaiting Narendra Modi’s storm of market reforms, the Prime Minister in his maiden speech to 
party members said that his government will be the ‘the government of the poor’.  Also, while 
lower middle classes might form the backbone of both the RSS and the BJP, the big industrial 
houses probably support only the BJP, as they would have hardly any benefit from supporting 
the RSS. This factor, therefore, reinforces also the previous discrepancy: the struggles between 
the party and the organization in the field of economy.  
The BJP-Congress rivalry 
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Thirdly, the Hindu nationalists, being in opposition in the Centre for most of their time, 
had to somehow both attack the Congress governments and not to compromise on their own 
core ideals. As long as BJS and BJP declared an economic policy which was partially socialist-
inspired (even though they would not admit it), it found it difficult to underline its differences 
from the openly socialist Congress. When it became more outspoken in its critique of socialist 
system of controls, it again lost the race with the Congress, which in 1991-1993 introduced 
stronger market reforms than the Hindu nationalists ever tried to introduce when in power or 
even envisaged when in opposition. It was only in 1999-2002 that the BJP evened the score. As 
it turns out, most main parties in India share some basic views on economy and these tend to 
be in favor of government control over free market play (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987). As 
argued by some, the only national party in India that had really stood for free enterprise was 
the long-defunct Swatantra Party (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987). Throughout the last two 
decades, both the BJP and the Congress, took pains to maneuver between low to middle-range 
interventionism and low to middle-range market reforms. At the same time both were in the 
need of politically attacking each other. The example here is BJP’s recent opposition to foreign 
direct investment in the retail sector. Introducing it was a dream of many foreign companies 
eyeing the Indian market, and the horror of India’s small shopkeepers. During the 2009-2014 
UPA rule, the government first decided to allow FDI in retail, but withdrew the decision in face 
of large protests of the shopkeepers and the opposition parties, including the BJP. The 
government eventually changed its mind one more time and opened India to FDI in retail, 
though with serious limitations. During the time of opposition to this move, Narendra Modi also 
strongly voiced his dissent and rhetorically asked: ‘What kind of country sells flour overseas and 
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then buys a chapati [unleavened bread]?’ Nowadays, however, his government does not 
promise to withdraw the decisions on FDI introduced by his criticized predecessors. 
Hindu nationalism and labor movements 
Fourthly, while the Hindu nationalists formally reject communism and socialism as 
foreign, anti-religious and seemingly anti-national, they in fact partially strive to achieve goals 
similar to the aims of those ideologies. One of the main aims of the Hindu nationalists is the 
consolidation (sangathan) of the Hindu nation. To achieve this, they claim to strive for equality 
(samrastā) of all classes, castes and communities. On one hand, the concept of class struggle 
would run against these goals, but on the other, the broader idea of eventual equality is 
included in both ideologies of the left and Hindu nationalism. The 1949 constitution of the RSS 
did not offer any broad view of economy. One of the scant economy-related remarks is 
mentioning the need of establishing a ‘disciplined’ and ‘organized’ industrial life (Kelkar, 2011).  
The document also condemns revolutions, as it claims to stand for an orderly evolution of 
society through legitimate means only (Kelkar, 2011). These remarks were a clear take on 
communism, whom the RSS perceived as one of its main threats, especially in the post-
independence period. While the RSS stressed the need to defend workers’ rights many times, it 
also considered strikes a last resort that should be retorted to as seldom as possible. The 
clashes between Hindu nationalists and socialist and communist organization began already in 
the pre-1939 period (Limaye, 2011). 
The RSS grow weary of the success of communist trade unions but on the other hand 
emulated their success. After India’s independence it formed own trade union to counter 
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communist influences). It was called the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (‘The Union of Indian 
Laborers’, hence BMS). This trade union was formed in 1955 as a part of the RSS. BMS grew 
immensely in 1970s to become one of India’s leading trade unions in 1990s (Bajpai, 2008, 
Mathur, 2008). The founder of BMS was Dattopant Thengadi, the same person who went on to 
establish SJM much later. BMS mobilizes labor and rejects capitalism, but also tries its best not 
to look similar to communist-influenced unions. The organization rejects the idea of class 
struggle, uses a saffron flag (like other Hindu nationalist organizations) instead of a red one and 
celebrates the Workers’ Day not on 1st of May, but on Vishwakarma Day (Vishwakarma was a 
god of artisans)(Basu et al., 1993, Bajpai, 2008). However, most of this is arguably symbolic, not 
real ideological differences. BMS was another organization that from time to time protests 
against its own government of the BJP, opposing exactly the same decisions that were criticized 
by the communist trade unions. 
Is there a religion vs. economy debate within the Hindu nationalist movement? 
 I would also add another point here, but rather as an issue worth considering than a 
factor similar in strength to the above ones. Hindu nationalism is an ideology that claims the 
existence of a Hindu nation, and therefore is labelled by some as ‘religious nationalism’ (Cf. 
Kanungo, 2002, for a brief overview of terms used to describe this ideology). BJP and RSS prefer 
the term ‘cultural nationalism’. Does the religious part of Hindutva’s origins influence the 
ideology’s stance on economy? The most famous case is the cow protection movements. The 
movement to halt the killings of cows, animals sacred to Hindus, emerged strong in the late 
19th century among organizations that might be considered Hindu nationalists’ ideological 
predecessors (Hansen, 2001). Although the biggest ideologue of Hindutva, V.D. Savarkar, was 
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seemingly not adverse to cow killing, the Hindu nationalists took to similar cow protection 
movements more than once in the course of the 20th century.  Cow protection was a recurrent 
idea in the manifestos of Hindu nationalist parties. Narendra Modi played a similar tune in at 
least one of his speeches. It also should be added that while cow slaughter (and subsequent 
consuming, selling in India or export or beef) may be economically important to some groups, it 
is not so important for the Indian economy as such. For Hindu nationalists it is therefore a 
clearly religious issue and they do not have to find a balance between religion and economy 
here. Can we, however, find more such examples?  
Since the RSS is dominated by Brahmans, the priestly class in the traditional Hindu social 
order, we could as well expect the promoting of vegetarianism, to which this class should 
adhere. But this is not the case. This example brings us to another question: if the RSS would 
promote such traditions, then which group’s traditions would it actually be? Even if it would 
choose Brahman values, then, in case of cuisine, the question would be – which Brahmans? The 
choice of cow protection was much safer, as the Hindu nationalists could safely ascertain that 
majority of Hindus does not consume beef. While the RSS and BJP do drum up certain religious 
issues, they usually make sure that they would be met with a huge support and would not, if 
possible, clash with their other ideas. The example here is their approach to the caste system. 
This system, along with class struggle, is surely an impediment to unify the Hindu nation. But 
the system also remains a central part of the Hindu religion. In such a case the RSS finds itself in 
a contradictive position: in order to successfully build a Hindu nation, it would have to fight 
Hindu social and religious rules. I would assume this is why the Hindu nationalists are 
outspoken in their criticism of inequalities in the Hindu society but never really launched a 
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large-scale movement to change the system, comparable to the cow protection movement 
(putting aside the question how does one fight a social system to which every member of such 
a movement would belong). Eventually, it is the nation which is paramount for the RSS and BJP, 
not religion. Many, if not most of the issues taken up by the Hindu nationalists have a religious 
aspect to them (even it is referred to as ‘cultural’ or otherwise), but religion is treated as means 
here, not the final goal. The relation of religion to economy in Hindu nationalist ideology should 
also be perceived from this angle. 
             If Brahman influence is to found in Hindu nationalist views on economy, this could be in 
what was referred to as ‘Brahmanical distaste for business and businessmen’ (Guha, 2007). 
How much this ‘distaste’ is nowadays common among Brahmans, remains a different issue that 
would need a completely different research. But it was visible throughout this article that the 
Hindu nationalists stressed the fact that material gains are not everything and should not 
dominate above the entire spiritual side of human life. This view was expressed, among others, 
by Golwalkar, Upadhyaya and Savarkar (all of which happened to be born in Brahman families).  
The last of these, curiously, uses a quote from Jesus Christ in this context (‘man does not live by 
bread alone’, Savarkar, n.d.). This constant talk of spirituality-above-materialism might be at 
least partially aimed at addressing the ‘Brahmanical distaste’. However, we have also seen that 
it did not really lead to promising any concrete economic solutions. Nowadays it seems that 
‘the Baniya [merchant] taste’ for economy matters more in terms of practical political actions 
than the ‘Brahmanical distaste’. 
It might be added here in passing that one of the BJP’s slogans regarding imports is – or 
was -  ‘computer chips – yes, potato chips – no’ (McGuire and Copland, 2007). This motto once 
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signalized the Hindu nationalists’ openness to bringing in crucial technology, but not allowing 
the imports of those articles that would not fit in the Hindu culture and customs. It might seen 
as aspect of a broader and even more ample credo of the RSS: ‘Be modern, not Western’. These 
are, however, once again declarations, not actions. While both the Rajiv Gandhi government of 
1984-1989 and the NDA government of 1999-2004 showed a special preference to some 
technologies, they would not really limit the selling materials that could be considered a threat 
to Indian traditions. The events examples such as the expulsion of Coca Cola in 1970s remain 
isolated cases and, at any rate, Coca Cola was actually asked to leave India at the same time as 
IBM, which in that case would mean ‘computer chips – no, potato chips and Cola – no’. The 
SJM’s opposition to Coca Cola, once the firm came back to India, occurred later, and was 
apparently not given a priority by the RSS. The same goes to the attacks on KFC which the 
central BJP leadership did not even support (McGuire and Copland, 2007). Another case is a 
mention of a Hindu nationalist project to produce cow urine-based soft drink. While the idea 
was mocked by many, from the Hindutva perspective it would seemingly make perfect sense. 
Cow urine is used in certain Hindu rituals and is said to possess purifying powers. A soft drink 
made out of it would be obviously promoted as a traditional alternative to Coca Cola and the 
like. Such a drink could theoretically become the perfect combination of swadeshi and 
protection of India’s traditions, the symbol of ‘Be modern, not Western’. The idea, however, 
was not only not put into practice but was seemingly supported by only a fraction of the Hindu 
nationalists and was never put forward by a popular movement. The above ideas and 
contradictions betray Hindu nationalists’ imprisonment in modernity. 
28 International Journal of Knowledge and Innovation in Business (IJKIB) 
December 2014, Vol.2, No.1, pp.1-38 
 
Is there a tradition vs. modernity debate regarding economy in the Hindu nationalist 
movement? 
As a form of nationalism, the ideology of RSS is not really conservative in its core, but 
reformist (even if it acquires some aspects of conservatism). Their rallying cry of going back to 
traditions does not amount to any practical program. When Upadhyaya promised to revive 
Indian traditional political economy, he was really putting forward socialist ideas. Golwalkar 
praised Gandhian idea of trusteeship in production as traditional, only to discard it in favor of 
free market. Fighting against Coca Cola, the Hindu nationalists could have simply promoted 
traditional drinks as say, lassi, a popular sweet or salty drink made from curds, ice cubicles and 
other additions, similar to a milk shake. Instead, some Hindu nationalists suggested producing a 
cow urine-based soft drink, therefore betraying their need to create new solutions rather than 
stick to the old ones.  
 Are there any alternative and traditional models of economy that the Hindu nationalists 
could have turned to? M. Gadgil and R. Guha proved that in at least part of India’s traditional 
communities, the caste system reinforced the balance of environment through the distribution 
of occupations, kinds of food that could be consumed by particular groups and the time when 
certain animals could be killed to prevent rampant exploitation of nature (Gadgil and Guha, 
2013). Theoretically, that is a tradition that the Hindu nationalists could call to return to. Of 
course, it may be argued that restoring such balance is not feasible anymore and would be very 
difficult to impose from above, but the same can be said about Gandhian economy: it might by 
idealistic and impossible, but still there are people who believe in it. The bottom line is that the 
Hindu nationalists do not even try to reconstruct such a model. Arguably, the explanation does 
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not lie in the fact that it would additionally strengthen the caste system, but in the fact that the 
proponents of Hindutva do not really want to recreate any traditional model of economy. 
Having said all of this, let me turn to the present BJP-led government’s declarations and deeds 
performed so far. 
 
The economic policy of the present BJP-led government 
The NDA government formed in 2014 is the first one in which the BJP has a majority on 
its own and is therefore in a comfortable position to introduce its reforms. The victory was 
arguably achieved thanks to a huge anti-incumbency actor, Modi’s charisma and personality 
cult, and a promise of development in times of an economic slowdown. During the last election 
campaign focused on promising economic growth more than before and talked less about 
religious and cultural issues around which it had mobilized its electorate in the past. Narendra 
Modi, so far serving as the chief minister of the state of Gujarat, pointed out to the progress of 
his state, promising to repeat the same success story all over India. Fulfilling these promises will 
be obviously a challenge for many reasons. One of them is that Modi, known for his openness 
to attract foreign and Indian companies and facilitating their expansion, will now have to face 
those BJP and RSS members that stick to the idea of economic nationalism. 
 As we can see, one tight-rope that the current prime minister has to walk is between his 
need to attract foreign direct investment and the defense of swadeshi. The change in approach 
towards FDI was first visible in BJP’s 1992 document. In the 1999-2002 period, when faced with 
criticism for abandoning the idea of protecting Indian companies, some leading members of the 
BJP said that the concept of swadeshi actually implied ‘going out to the world and winning’ 
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(McGuire, Copland, 2007). In September 2014, in his typical rhetorical style and pun fashion, 
prime minister Modi claimed that for Indians FDI actually means ‘First Develop India’ (My 
definition of FDI for people of India is ‘First Develop India’, 2014). He spoke these words on 
25th September, while commencing his flagship ‘Make in India’ campaign, in which the 
government promises to reduce its controls and especially bureaucracy (including  on the state 
level), act as ‘help-desk’ to firms, develop infrastructure, focus on the manufacturing sector, 
and invite powerful global companies to India. There is talk of ‘deregulation’ and ‘public private 
partnership’ here, but not directly of selling stakes in public companies. The stress is also on 
manufacturing and then exporting, rather than imports. Modi also elaborated that the coming 
of foreign companies to India is needed to raise working opportunities and purchasing power of 
Indians. What is more, the whole campaign is also meant to strengthen Indian companies, so 
that they would not leave the country and become more competitive globally (PM launches 
Make in India global initiative, 2014). In a manner typical of politicians, Narendra Modi wants to 
use the Make in India campaign to convince us that everybody will be happy: both foreign and 
Indian companies, both labor and industrialists. Two solutions most vehemently criticized by 
the swadeshi faction – raising FDI and allowing more imports – are not mentioned here. 
What we see here might be actually modest deregulation wrapped up in a swadeshi cloth. The 
Make in India campaign website and publications select 25 promising sectors of various 
industries. In each case, both foreign investors in this sector as well as future investing 
opportunities are mentioned. There is also a ‘FDI policy’ section and in each case it spells out 
the FDI allowed so far, not promised by the government for the coming years (cf. Make in India 
2014). If it would stop here, the proponents of swadeshi would certainly be happy, while the 
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multinational companies would ask how, then, would Make in India actually enhance their 
investment options. In practice, however, the government is planning to raise the level of FDI in 
at least some sectors. The expressions in the 2014 BJP election manifesto was careful in that 
matter: ‘Barring the multi-brand retail sector, FDI will be allowed in sectors wherever needed 
for job and asset creation, infrastructure and acquisition of niche technology and specialized 
expertise. BJP is committed to protecting the interest of small and medium retailers, SMEs and 
those employed by them.’ (BJP Election Manifesto 2014. Ek Bharat, Shreshtha Bharat, 2014). 
As of September 2014 there was talk of selling 5% of government stakes in Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation, 11.36% in National Hydroelectric Power and 10% in Coal India (Disinvestment 
takes off, 2014) and selling of some projects of these companies to foreign firms (Das, 2014). 
The government also raised investment limit in insurance and cleared projects to raise the FDI 
cap in defense to 49% and in railway infrastructure to 100% (FDI cap raised to 100% for 
Railways, 49% for defense projects, 2014). In this case the FDI in railway infrastructure and 
defense is already mentioned as ‘allowed’ in the Make in India campaign. Insurance is not a 
sector mentioned in the campaign at all. A further move to allow up to 100% FDI in defense is 
also considered, which the Make in India campaign publication also does not mention. The 
liberalization of petrol prices, started already in fact by the previous government, has been 
finished by Modi’s government on October, once elections of members for the legislative 
assemblies of two states, Maharashtra and Haryana, had come to an end. Nowadays there is 
talk of ending the LPG subsidy for richer citizens and that particular move should be accepted 
by both the proponents of the free market as well as believers in swadeshi (Govt may do away 
with LPG subsidy for rich: Jaitley, 2014). On the other hand, the new government of India also 
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refused to sign a major WTO deal and was praised by the swadeshi faction for doing that 
(Sheasley, 2014). Later, in November, the US and the WTO, which first seemed to be adamant 
in not changing the draft of the deal, seemingly agreed on India’s condition that it would only 
sign the deal if it could permanently continue its food security policy within the new WTO 
standards (As PM Narendra Modi heads to G20, India and US announce WTO deal, 2014). 
Until now, the RSS is giving a clean chit to Narendra Modi, but it is obvious that already 
some of his above mentioned decisions and promises are not to its liking.  SJM wants the new 
government to limit imports and withdraw the decision of allowing more FDI in the defense 
sector. (Krishnan, 2014). BMS wants liberalization of railways to be stopped. In July the RSS was 
said to halt the government’s GM crops trials, but this issue was also on BJP’s election campaign 
agenda (Chandrasekhar, 2014, Singh, 2014). It is also worth looking at some issues of the 
Organiser, the English-language mouthpiece of the RSS. Most of the articles are full of praise for 
the new prime minister, but there are some noteworthy exceptions. An August issue article 
criticized the government primarily for selecting the manufacturing sector, rather than services, 
as its focus for the Make in India campaign. Of the three points raised there one is economic in 
nature (the services sector is growing faster than manufacturing) and the other environmental 
(the growth of manufacturing will destroy the environment, as it is happening in China). There 
is, however, also a typically swadeshi point: ‘Prime Minister Modi, moreover, has also 
welcomed foreign investors to set up manufacturing units in India. Question is why can the job 
not be accomplished by Indian businessmen?’ (Jhunjhunwala, 2014). The same month one of 
the Organiser authors reacted to government disinvestment plans warning that ‘selling the 
huge profit making and dividend paying PSEs [Public Sector Enterprises] would result in killing a 
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sheep for one meal only- the other option is feeding it well and getting wool for many years.’ 
The same piece warned the BJP that one of its previous, 1999-2002 period privatizations did not 
work out (Saurav, S., 2014). In a more recent interview, the chief of the RSS Akhil Bharatiya 
Gousewa (The All-India Cow Service) praised the government for dedicating an amount of 
money to cow protection but demanded a ban on beef exports (Ban Cow Beef Export 
Forthwith – Shankarlal, 2014). 
  So far, the economic strategy of Modi’s cabinet has been to (1) partially privatize, but 
not to sell the majority stakes of government companies, (2) carefully select the sectors or 
projects being opened to FDI, and (3) focus on manufacturing rather than services or agriculture. 
Especially the last strategy had been tried out by Modi in Gujarat. He will possibly also show 
some degree of preference for Indian big companies over foreign ones. Obviously, it has only 
been few months since inception and the government can surely take more radical steps. 
However, taking into consideration all aspects mentioned here, I would risk predicting that 
Narendra Modi’s economic policy will not be as much pro-market as many big companies 
expect (though it will still be more pro-market than most of India’s previous governments). If 
his government tries a more throughout liberalization he will come into direct conflict with the 
RSS (to which he belongs) and the swadeshi faction of his party. It remains to be seen whether 
he and his companions will be able to spread the new interpretation of the swadeshi concept 
among the RSS and BJP rank and file. 
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